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Metaphysics as Essentially Imaginative and Aiming at Understanding 
Michaela Markham McSweeney 
 
Abstract: I explore the view that metaphysics is essentially imaginative. I argue that 
the central goal of metaphysics on this view is understanding, not truth. Metaphysics-
as-essentially-imaginative provides novel answers to challenges to both the value and 
epistemic status of metaphysics.  
 
 
Introduction 
There are (at least) two perennial challenges to metaphysics: How could metaphysics be valuable? 
And how could metaphysical beliefs be justified? Recently, some philosophers have attempted to 
answer at least some of these questions by claiming that the only way that metaphysics can meet 
these challenges is to be continuous with science. There are two ways this might be cashed out; first, 
ontologically or metaphysically: that there is nothing ‘supernatural’ or outside the bounds of what we 
might ordinarily think of as being in the domain of the sciences. Second, methodologically: that in order 
for metaphysics to be valuable and justified, its methodology (and, perhaps, its goals) must be 
continuous with the methodology of science. Here, I will be exclusively focused on the latter (to be 
sharpened later) claim, and will refer to it as the naturalistic claim.1  
 
I explore a different picture of metaphysics, according to which the answers to these questions are 
to be found in the fact that metaphysics, like art, expands our imaginative capacities: metaphysics is 
an essentially imaginative pursuit. Insofar as this is a descriptive claim, it is true only of some 
metaphysical work. So the picture is normative: I envision a picture of metaphysics on which it is 
essentially imaginative, and explore what work this might do in answering the perennial challenges.  
 
It is often suggested that in addition to art’s aesthetic value, it might also be valuable because it 
expands our imaginative capacities by allowing us to see ourselves, each other, or the world from a 
different perspective. Expanding our imaginative capacities in this way is intrinsically valuable, but is 
also instrumental to making us more empathetic, as well as to inculcating other emotions, values, or 
ideas in us that might make us better people. While these claims may be contentious, I take them for 
granted in this paper.  
 
On the metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative view that I begin to develop here, a central goal of 
metaphysical theorizing is understanding—that is, what metaphysicians should want from their 
readers is for their readers to gain as full of an understanding as possible of their theories. And 
metaphysicians’ goals in elaborating their own theories should also be to gain a full understanding of 
their own theories. It might also be that metaphysics aims at truth, or that metaphysical realism is 
true, but neither of these things are required for metaphysics to aim at understanding. Thus, the 
question of how beliefs in metaphysical theories could be justified is disconnected from the question 
of what the value of metaphysics is.  
                                               
1 A broad but very incomplete list of examples: Ladyman and Ross (2007) propound the naturalistic claim and also try to 
develop a metaphysics that satisfies it; Bryant (2017) argues that non-naturalistic metaphysics’ only value is instrumental 
(to naturalistic metaphysics); Morganti and Tahko (2017) try to develop a ‘moderate’ naturalistic metaphysics which 
would likely not satisfy the other naturalists here, but which my view is just as much a response to; Maclaurin and Dyke 
(2011) argue that non-naturalistic metaphysics lacks pragmatic value. Quine’s naturalism and “web of belief” view (e.g. 
1951, 1970) seems to entail the naturalistic claim, and neo-quinean metaphysicians’ methodology typically either 
implicitly or explicitly embraces it (e.g. Sider (2011)).  
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The closest view to mine (that I know of) is Rosen’s (forthcoming). Rosen motivates a kind of 
agnostic fictionalism about speculative metaphysics. Conceiving of metaphysics as essentially 
imaginative also lends itself to fictionalism about metaphysics. This is not, however, for any of the 
reasons that normally motivate us to move to fictionalism. Instead, it is because treating metaphysics 
as essentially imaginative makes metaphysics similar to fictional art in important ways. I think that 
fictionalism is false, though. While I won’t motivate that view here, I will say some things about why 
metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative does not entail that we should be fictionalists, and also will 
begin to address how we might begin to start combining the view with metaphysical realism (though 
much more needs to be said here).  
 
1. Metaphysics as Essentially Imaginative 
There is a vast literature on what imagination is that I won’t have space to engage with in detail. I 
will leave things loose and informal, and appeal to the pre-theoretic notion of imagination that 
Gendler and Liao describe like this:  
 
To imagine is to represent without aiming at things as they actually, presently, and 
subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to 
represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. 
Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that 
something to be the case. (Gendler and Liao 2019). 
 
Many philosophers have pointed out that imagination is up to us in a certain important way that 
perception is not.2 Similarly, imaginative pursuits are up to us in certain important ways. Insofar as 
arts are imaginative pursuits, they are creative. Authors and painters and sculptors determine the 
content, shape, composition, etc. of their work. One difference between an essentially imaginative 
pursuit and one that just happens to involve some imaginative work is that essentially imaginative 
pursuits are up to us in this kind of way. This also explains why natural science is not an essentially 
imaginative pursuit: science clearly involves imaginative work, especially in its more theoretical 
aspects, and in particular in the creative aspect of coming up with scientific theories but science is not 
up to us in the same way that art is. The way the natural world is—at least, the ways that we can 
observe and discover the natural world is—constrains and shapes our scientific theories. While the 
way the natural world also constrains certain things about art, that is in virtue of the us being the 
kind of creatures we are, unable to break laws of nature or transcend our humanity. Art need not 
answer to the natural world in the same way that natural science does. 
 
Metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative captures some, but not all, of actual metaphysical theorizing. 
Metaphysical views are often wild, and seem far from how the world actually appears, or what 
common sense tells us about it. They don’t attempt to represent the manifest image, but rather to 
represent some way the world might be “underneath” the appearances. I suspect that, in day-to-day 
life, the world did not appear to Spinoza the way he described it (1667), or to Lewis the way he 
described it (e.g. in his (1986).) (Though both had, I think, metaphysical views that are consistent 
with, or even explain, the manifest image. What I mean is that there are crucial features of their 
views—e.g. the monism in Spinoza’s case, and the concrete modal realism in Lewis’s—that it is 
quite unlikely seemed to either of them to be mere reporting on some combination of their 
                                               
2 See Wittgenstein (1981, §632), Sartre (1972: 7); Gendler and Liao (2019) and Balcerak Jackson (2019) both use the ‘up 
to us’ terminology. 
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perceptual experiences + ‘common sense’.) Other metaphysical views are similar: compositional 
nihilism requires some re-envisioning of reality. So do ontologies of sets and spacetime points, or 
only properties.  
 
Such views are developed by their authors doing imaginative work: imagining coherent ways the 
world might be. I mostly am—intentionally, but not for reasons of perceived relative importance!— 
focusing on metaphysical views that can be seen as attempts to develop pictures of reality that aren’t 
centrally about us, our activities, or the parts of the world we create. But there is something 
importantly common here between this claim and ameliorative social metaphysics, which is also—
perhaps more obviously—crucially imaginative: I take it our task there is, at least in part, to imagine 
a politically better world, and to try to literally create that world through shifting our concepts, 
language, and ontology itself. 
 
One might point out that metaphysicians sometimes argue for views on which something like a mix 
of perceptual information and ‘common sense’ accurately describe what reality is like. (For example, 
take ‘conservative’ views about ontology, which say that ordinary objects like tables and frogs exist, 
but extraordinary ones like turkey-trouts and ‘incars’ do not, e.g. Markosian (1998), Korman (2015).) 
These views look less imaginative. But later, I will argue that they fit the metaphysics-as-essentially-
imaginative picture. 
 
Our above definition says that to imagine “is to represent without aiming at things as they actually, 
presently, and subjectively are”. If Lewis and Spinoza believed their views, then in what sense are 
they imaginings? Imaginings are supposed to be contrasted with beliefs, in that they don’t aim at 
things as they actually are, as well as with perception, which perhaps can be thought of as forcing an 
appearance (or, simply, the world, depending on one’s view of perception) upon us. The key here is 
in the idea that imaginings aren’t supposed to aim at things as they actually, presently, and 
subjectively are. Many metaphysicians must engage in imaginative work because, initially, their views 
do not subjectively seem to them to be true, even if they believe them.  
 
Thus, the idea is, imagination can play a crucial role in transforming how the world subjectively seems 
to us. Gendler and Liao say that “One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the 
actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s 
own.” But one can also use imagination to represent possibilities and perspectives in order to make 
them our own; that is, in order to make them subjectively seem true to us. While he is not talking 
about metaphysics as a whole, nor about subjective seeming, but rather about conceivability, Yablo 
suggests something very similar to this: “It cannot be a prerequisite of imagining an X to be under 
the prior impression that Xs can exist. Which leaves… as the likelier explanation: it comes to me 
that Xs are possible in the act of imagining one.” (1993, 30). Yablo’s idea is that we don’t wait until 
we find some world conceivable in order to imagine it; rather, we imagine that state of the world in 
order to determine whether it is conceivable.  
 
Yablo says that “it cannot be a prerequisite of imagining an X to be under the prior impression that 
Xs can exist”. (1993, 30). This is right, but more can be said. For we also use imagination to gain a 
better understanding of our own beliefs, by making our beliefs subjectively seem true to us. In doing 
so, we come to better understand the things that we believe. I think that this is part of what 
metaphysical theorizing is for, for the metaphysician herself, on the metaphysics-as-essentially-
imaginative view: to turn her own propositional beliefs into full-on subjective seemings.  
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What do I mean by the world subjectively seeming some way to us? There are plenty of things that most 
of us believe, but that don’t subjectively seem to be true to us. Subjective seeming requires either 
belief plus in-the-moment perceptual experience (it subjectively seems to me as I write this sentence 
that I am on an airplane, because I both believe that and  am having a perceptual experience of 
being on an airplane), or belief plus phenomenal imagination of that belief (it subjectively seems to 
me that rabbits have big ears, because I both believe that and phenomenally imagine that rabbits 
have big ears).3  
 
What about phenomenal imagination? Roughly, it is having some kind of phenomenology that isn’t 
immediately and directly caused by something external to me; that is non-propositional; and that 
represents things as being thus-and-so. While propositional imagination is not phenomenal 
imagination, I don’t want to suggest that we need to be able to visualize (or even sensorily imagine 
with another sense) an object in order to phenomenally imagine it. Perhaps phenomenal imagination 
is akin to Yablo’s ‘objectual imagination’: imagining the tiger itself, which he suggests does not 
require sensory imagination, but can be distinguished from propositional imagination in that it (a) 
lacks alethic content and (b) is referential (1993, 27).  
 
But the simplest examples of phenomenal imagination all involve visualization, and subjective 
seeming is also best understood by example. It subjectively seems to me that the tennis ball in front 
of me is roughly spherical, and I believe that it is roughly spherical: I have a propositional belief that 
it is roughly spherical, but I also have an associated perceptual experience that (seemingly veridically) 
represents the ball as being roughly spherical. In this case, I also phenomenally imagine the ball as 
roughly spherical: if I close my eyes and try to imagine the ball, or it isn’t in my presence, I imagine it 
as roughly spherical.  
 
With the tennis ball, we have perceptual experience and belief that together seem to ground our 
phenomenal imagination of the ball as being roughly spherical. But perceptual experience of an 
object being a certain way is not necessary for us to phenomenally imagine the object being that way. 
Most of us believe that the earth is roughly spherical. If subjective seeming requires that we 
veridically perceive it as such, then it does not subjectively seem to most of us (e.g. not astronauts) that 
the earth is roughly spherical. But subjective seeming requires either belief plus either perceptual 
representation of the world as matching the belief or phenomenal imagination of the world as 
matching the belief. And both belief and phenomenal imagination can be grounded in things other 
than perceptual experience. It subjectively seems to most of us that the earth is roughly spherical, 
and that DNA has a helix structure, even though most of us have never directly perceived either the 
earth or DNA as such. 
 
In contrast, consider special relativity. Many of us (who know about basic physics and who can 
ignore pessimistic doubts) believe that special relativity is true. But, it doesn’t subjectively seem to 
any of us that special relativity is true, because it is at least very hard—maybe impossible--to 
                                               
3 Thus ‘subjective seeming’ is a technical term I am introducing, but it is closely related to uses of ‘sensory seeming’ and 
‘perceptual seeming’ in the literature. However, such terms typically aren’t intended to the second, and more important 
for my purposes here, sense of ‘subjective seeming’ for me: phenomenal imagination plus belief. Rather, they are typically 
taken to involve something like immediate perception (rather than perceptual imagination). That aside, by requiring that 
subjective seeming involves a perceptual or phenomenally imaginative state plus a belief state, the existing account of 
perceptual seeming that my view is closest to is what Chudnoff and DiDomenico (2015, p. 536) refer to as the 
‘composition view’—that perceptual seeming involves a perceptual state and a ‘seeming’ state. For endorsements of this 
view (broadly construed), see e.g. Brogaard (2013, f. 7), Conee (2013, p. 54), Lyons (2015), Tucker (2010, p. 532).  
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phenomenally imagine special relativity’s being true. And many of us believe that the temperature of 
the earth’s core is about 6000 degrees Celsius. But it does not subjectively seem to be so (though it 
might well subjectively seem that the earth’s core is very hot). Finally, consider a very different kind 
of case: you read in the newspaper that your childhood best friend, who you know to be sweet, kind, 
and caring (but who you have lost touch with) has pled guilty to murder. You (might) come to 
believe that your friend is a murderer, but I doubt that it will subjectively seem to you that your 
friend is a murderer. 
 
These cases suggest that one route towards being able to phenomenally imagine something that we 
don’t have perceptual access to is having lots of access to various kinds of models or representations 
of the fact in question (e.g. drawings or three-dimensional models of DNA, globes, two-dimensional 
images that ‘look’ three-dimensional, etc.). It’s not enough to have a physical model of the thing in 
question (we have models of the earth that are cut open and include its core); our models have to 
represent the very property in question in a way that gives us some kind of indirect perceptual 
awareness of what it is for the object to have that property.  
 
When you close your eyes and conjure up an image of (if you can do so) the earth, you tend to 
imagine something that appears to be spherical. When you close your eyes and conjure up an image 
of DNA, it is helix-shaped. But we (arguably) can’t close our eyes and visually imagine what it is like 
for special relativity to be true, or imagine the heat of the earth’s core. One reason that models help 
us learn is that they allow us to make our beliefs seem subjectively true by helping us phenomenally 
imagine what they represent. We base our visual imagining of DNA on the many models (and other 
kinds of representations) of DNA that we have seen.  
 
There is an important connection between subjective seeming and understanding. Phenomenal 
imagination can help us understand what the world would be like if a theory were true. So, if we 
believe that the theory is true, subjective seeming can help us understand what it is that we actually 
believe about the world. While he was talking about a different kind of model, I think this is part of 
what was behind Einstein’s (1919) suggestion that only ‘constructive’ theories—theories with 
constructive models—can get us true understanding.4  
 
Another way that something can subjectively seem true to us can be seen by altering the murderer 
case: you have remained close to your friend while watching him become more and more angry, 
violent, and aggressive; you have seen him assault someone at a bar. And now it is reported to you 
that he murdered someone. You didn’t witness this murder. You don’t have perceptual awareness 
that he murdered someone—your evidence is testimonial--but it may well subjectively seem to you 
that he did murder someone, because it is continuous with your knowledge of him, and thus easy to 
both phenomenally imagine and believe because it is “in character”.  
 
There are other ways for it to subjectively seem that the world is a certain way. But the third 
important way for our purposes is this: coming up with and articulating the theory that things are 
thus-and-so can help the world subjectively seem to be thus-and-so to us. We don’t have a visual 
model of concrete modal realism, but we do have a whole book that allows us to attempt to imagine 
what the world would be like if concrete modal realism. I assume that Lewis and Spinoza genuinely 
believed their own views. Of course, we don’t know whether they subjectively seemed true to them. 
But often, part of the process of creating imaginative philosophical theories involves a kind of 
                                               
4 For further discussion, see my (2020).  
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subjectively coming to see the theory as true, rather than merely believing it. While philosophers 
might not start out, when they engage in investigation into the world, with the world subjectively 
seeming as their theories say it is, many of us end up there. The process of defending and 
articulating a metaphysical view can move the author of that view from not having a subjective 
seeming that the view is true to having one—even if the author initially believed the view. And since 
subjective seeming is a route to understanding, as it allows us to understand what the world is like if 
that theory is true, this makes sense of the fact that articulating a theory—one that might involve 
propositions that we already believed—allows us to come to understand that theory in a way that we 
might not have before articulating it. One value of articulating metaphysical theories, for the 
metaphysician herself, is to gain better understanding of things she already believes.  
 
What about the metaphysician’s audience? We needn’t believe a metaphysical theory in order to 
phenomenally imagine it as true. We can attempt to phenomenally imagine that they are true, even if 
we don’t believe them. We can also, as we perhaps do with fiction, occupy a middle ground between 
phenomenal imagination and full-blown subjective seeming: we can suspend our disbelief in a theory 
and phenomenally imagine that it is true, thus, perhaps, having it temporarily subjectively seem to us 
that it is true. And maybe this is enough for understanding; maybe what we need for understanding 
is to be able to get in a position where it can, temporarily but non-fleetingly, subjectively seem to us 
to be true.  
 
One of the goals of e.g. the novelist and the metaphysician is, at a coarse-grained level, quite similar: 
to convince the reader to briefly suspend their ordinary beliefs about the world around them and 
‘get inside’ a different reality. What does it mean to get inside this ‘different’ reality (which might, in 
the metaphysics case, simply be our reality)? I claim: it is for it to (at least temporarily) subjectively 
seem to be true.  
 
2. How does this help with the value and justification challenges?  
If metaphysics is essentially imaginative, then it is much more like art than like science. (I note that 
plenty of parts of science seem to have much in common with metaphysics and art in this respect: 
the so-called “context of discovery” seems replete with imaginative work. But, I remind my reader, 
science is not up to us in the way that both art and, I am arguing, metaphysics are.)5 This suggests that 
we don’t need to answer the justification challenge in order to answer the value challenge. (The 
justification challenge is not: why are we justified in engaging in metaphysical theorizing? Rather, it 
is: how could we be justified in believing a particular metaphysical theory?) If metaphysics is 
essentially imaginative, we don’t need to ever be justified in believing a metaphysical thesis in order 
for metaphysics to be valuable, just as we needn’t be justified in believing that a novel is literally true 
in order for the novel to be valuable. Indeed, it might be the (albeit temporary) unjustified belief (plus 
phenomenal imagination) that the circumstances of the novel are literally true that, in part, make 
reading the novel valuable.   
 
One value of art is that it expands our imagination and imaginative capacities. There is independent 
value in both expanding our imagination and imaginative capacities, and in being able to “see the 
world” from someone else’s perspective. The non-social metaphysics I’m focusing on here doesn’t 
                                               
5 I note that Rosen (forthcoming) flirts with the idea that metaphysics is just all “context of discovery”, and so I owe this 
way of thinking about this to him.  
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give us any direct insight into what it’s like to be a different person.6 It doesn’t obviously help us 
morally. But it does (when done well) allow us to inhabit other perspectives on reality, and it does 
help us expand our imagination and imaginative capacities. So even if these turn out to be the only 
values of metaphysics, metaphysics is still valuable if it is essentially imaginative. 
 
Inhabiting other perspectives on reality requires that we (a) temporarily suspend any disbelief we 
have as to the truth or accuracy of those perspectives and (b) be able to genuinely imagine what the 
world looks like from those perspectives. And this is one way to come to understand something.  
 
Fiction—as well as art more broadly—sometimes has a goal of understanding. But on the 
metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative picture, metaphysics is special in that its goal is always 
understanding. If understanding is important independent of truth, justification, or knowledge—and 
I think there is a good case to be made that it is, though it will perhaps disappoint readers that I 
won’t make it here—then metaphysics is valuable because it facilitates our understanding, even if the 
content of what we are understanding turns out to be false.7 
 
Good fiction has an additional value that much of metaphysics lacks: aesthetic value. I think that 
aesthetic value is actually crucial to good metaphysics as well, but the value in question might be 
somewhat different; perhaps the aesthetic value of a well-written piece of metaphysical theory lies 
somewhere in between the kind of aesthetic value that literature has and that of a beautiful 
mathematical proof. This kind of value, despite being important, is not my focus here. However, 
one might think that the value of imagination, and of facilitating understanding itself, is aesthetic or 
quasi-aesthetic as well.  Rosen gestures at a view in this vicinity about the value of theory-building in 
speculative metaphysics:  
 
The value of science on this conception is partly cognitive. To know that quantum 
electrodynamics is an acceptable theory is to know quite a lot about nature. But it is also 
partly “aesthetic”, though the term is not quite right…When we admire a complex work of 
art, we don’t just admire the object. We respond to the fact that a person made it by 
exercising certain capacities — technical skill, but also the creative capacity to see that a 
thing like this could be made. On the view I’m urging, scientific model-building has a 
similar value, and it has this value regardless of whether it’s an oracle for disclosing hidden 
truths that would be intrinsically worth knowing. If there is a defense of speculative 
metaphysics as the fictionalist conceives it—metaphysics as model-building — it runs 
along similar lines (Rosen forthcoming, 16.)  
 
I largely agree with Rosen here about the value question, but I think he misses some of the sources 
of value in metaphysics: those that come directly from phenomenal imagination, subjective seeming, 
and understanding. 
 
Fictionalism is a natural extension of the view that metaphysics is essentially imaginative, and it 
allows us to dispense with the justification question. I’ve claimed that understanding should be seen 
as one of the central goals of metaphysics. But if understanding only requires temporary subjective 
                                               
6 Though it might give us indirect insight, if we like the Nietzschean idea that philosophy is ‘involuntary and 
unconscious autobiography’, or, as I do, some more socially situated version of this idea. 
7 See my (redacted) for the beginnings of an account of the importance of understanding independently of other 
epistemic aims.  
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seeming—of the kind we can get when we temporarily suspend disbelief in e.g. the world of Middle 
Sister in Anna Burns’ novel Milkman and have the world subjectively seem to us as it does to an 
eighteen-year-old Catholic woman in 1970s Belfast—then to understand something does not require 
having a justified belief in it. So, if metaphysics is essentially imaginative, and a central goal of 
metaphysics is understanding, we might not need to answer the justification question at all. Certainly 
we are not actually justified in believing that we are in 1970s Belfast. Still, there is something 
important in us understanding what it was like to be an eighteen year old woman in 1970s Belfast, 
and we arguably can’t come to understand that solely through historical record. Likewise, perhaps 
we are never really justified in believing metaphysical theories, if their value is in us coming to 
understand what the world would be like if they were true.  
 
However, not all of us will want to take the step to fictionalism. Insofar as anyone thinks that 
metaphysics also aims at truth, and is not just like fiction, we still need to answer the justification 
question. Thus far what I’ve said suggests that believing a metaphysical thesis can be conceived of as 
an experience akin to the experience of suspending one’s ordinary beliefs and temporarily ‘believing’ 
a fiction (or even akin to simply experiencing a work of art that doesn’t make any propositional 
assertions). The crucial difference (for the non-fictionalist) is that, while the fiction is neither literally 
true nor aims to be literally true—and in typical cases, we have overwhelming evidence that it is not 
true—the metaphysical thesis might be, and we rarely have overwhelming evidence that it is not 
true. (More carefully: we rarely have overwhelming evidence that it is not a disjunct of a perhaps 
very long disjunction that itself is likely to be true—where all the possible views in logical space 
about the particular topic/domain are in the disjunction.) So, unlike in the fictional case, what we are 
justified in believing is that the metaphysical thesis is an epistemic possibility about the way the 
world is. On one picture of justification, we actually can’t be justified in believing particular 
metaphysical theories, but we can be justified in believing that particular metaphysical theories might 
be true.  
 
If metaphysics is essentially imaginative, then one of the goals of metaphysics and fiction is similar: 
to get the reader to suspend disbelief and have it subjectively seem that the theory or fiction is true. 
The important difference is that when we suspend disbelief and it temporarily subjectively seems to 
us that a fiction is true, we do not (typically) learn that the fiction is actually a genuine way the world 
might be. But when we do so with a metaphysical theory, we do learn that that theory is a genuine 
way the world might be.  
 
So, one option for the non-fictionalist might be to go the humble route: we are never really justified 
in believing any particular metaphysical thesis, but we still learn things about the world when we 
suspend disbelief and allow the world to subjectively seem to us as a metaphysical theory says it is. 
We might learn, for example, that the world might be like p, for some p. Balcerak Jackson (2018) 
argues that we can get this kind of justification from imagination. I suspect we can actually get 
something stronger for metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative. To see what it might look like, I want 
to take a brief detour by asking what the point of argument is if metaphysics is essentially 
imaginative.  
 
3. What are Arguments For? 
According to the metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative picture, metaphysicians’ central goal is—or 
rather, should be—to give us a ‘picture’ (metaphorically speaking) of reality that can get us into a 
space in which it (at least temporarily) subjectively seems to us that the world is the way they claim it is; 
and thus, for us to come to understand their views. This makes it sound as though metaphysics has a 
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lot—too much, perhaps—in common with certain kinds of art. So what are arguments for on this 
picture? Perhaps arguments themselves have aesthetic value akin to that of mathematical proofs. 
While I think here is something beautiful about an original, well-crafted, argument, this is not my 
focus here.  
 
Arguments play an important role in both answering the justification challenge and in establishing 
understanding through imagination. There might not be anything even prima facie inconsistent with 
metaphysics centrally involving arguments and also being essentially imaginative. Arguments in 
philosophy are often thought of as attempts to convince the reader of a view. This is consistent with 
my picture on which the goal of the metaphysician should be to get the reader to fully understand 
her view, by helping her to temporarily suspend disbelief and get the world to subjectively seem as 
the view says it is—the convincingness of an argument maps onto how able we are to successfully 
suspend disbelief and have the view subjectively seem true.  
 
There are many different ways that artists can convince their appreciators of a certain kind of way of 
looking at the world, or a fiction, or a different perspective. In some photography and painting, for 
example, this is done by making a photo or painting appear to be ‘from’ a certain perspective in 
space, and positioning the viewer in a position that is quite close to that. In some works of written 
fiction, this is done by writing in evocative language that draws the reader into, at least briefly, 
‘seeing’ the world through the perspective of a character.  
 
On the metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative view, the role of arguments in metaphysics is similar 
to the role of these other ways of convincing viewers and readers of certain kinds of pictures of and 
perspectives on reality. I will give two examples. First, there is a picture of philosophical 
argumentation on which I convince you to adopt a view by appealing only to things that you already 
believe—or to which I can quickly convince you to assent to—and show you that a conclusion that 
you perhaps initially found somewhat wild and implausible (or simply had not considered) follows. 
Maybe this sort of argument, the idea is, is like art for the hyperrational. (I don’t mean this as a 
compliment, even though I enjoy such arguments!) Sometimes art appeals to our emotions in order to 
allow us to see reality (or non-reality!) differently. But arguments seem to appeal to our ability to 
reason to do so. Some of us might be more moved into temporary subjective seemings by emotions, 
others by hard, dry, logic-chopping. (I note that this distinction is not at all as clear as I am making it 
out to be.) That said, one might worry about whether hard, dry logic-chopping can really secure 
phenomenal imagination and thus whether it can get us full-on subjective seeming rather than just 
belief. But think about the two murderer cases. We don’t need much to be moved to imagine that 
our friend who we have seen violently assaulting someone has murdered someone. But we need a lot 
if it seems out of character (from our perspective) for him. It may be that if metaphysical views are 
close enough in character to what already subjectively seems to us to be true, we can be moved, and 
perhaps that we need more picture-painting and hand-holding when it comes to metaphysical views 
that are very far away from what subjectively seems to us to be true. Starting with premises that 
themselves seem subjectively true makes it easier to be moved towards a conclusion’s seeming 
subjectively true.  
 
Many arguments in metaphysics don’t fit this pattern. One common move in contemporary 
metaphysics involves trying to rescue a view from a serious—perhaps seemingly devastating—
objection. Two very different examples: first, some attempts to recover platonism from epistemic 
(or “reliability”) challenges give arguments about how particular versions of the view can 
successfully answer those challenges. These arguments are often the central arguments in favor of 
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the view—that is, their authors are not trying to convince you of platonism. Instead, they are trying 
to convince you that there is a way past a stumbling block for platonism. The idea here is this, I take 
it: platonism is a view that is already plausible for a variety of reasons, but the epistemic challenge 
blocks us from being able to imagine the world as platonistic. So if we can successfully answer that 
challenge, we can go back to imagining the world as platonistic. (See, e.g., Balaguer (1998), 
McSweeney (ms).)  
 
Second, return to the ‘common sense’ theories of composition (e.g. Korman (2015), Markosian 
(1998)). These theories are no different in kind from attempts to recover platonism. Problems have 
been raised for common-sense views about composition, such that many metaphysicians now seem 
to find the view to be a non-starter; that is, they aren’t willing to engage in even imagining that the 
world is as our common sense says it is, compositionally speaking. In this sense, views that say that 
the world is just as it initially seems to be to us can count as imaginative, because they are aimed at 
metaphysicians who have been convinced to rule out such a view. And the way in which they are 
imaginative is not in conceiving of the world differently from the way it appears to us—for the view 
is that the world is basically just as it appears to us! Instead, they aim to allow those of us who have 
been swayed by objections to re-conceive of the world that way, by providing us with a way to 
overcome (in this case multiple!) stumbling blocks to doing so.  
 
Arguments play two crucial roles in justification on this picture. First, philosophers with certain 
views of justification might like the idea that, if metaphysics is fundamentally imaginative, at best it 
can provide us with justification for believing that p is a way the world might be. But arguments still 
play an important role in motivating that p is a way the world might be. They can serve to sway us 
into being able to suspend disbelief and let the world subjectively seem as their authors claim it is. 
I’ve argued (in (redacted)) that a necessary epistemic condition for justified belief that two theories 
are metaphysically equivalent is that we can conceive of what it would be like for them 
simultaneously being true. If this is right, then we need to be able to conceive of what it is like for 
one of the theories to be true before we can compare it to others. It seems to me that we can’t be 
justified in believing that a metaphysical theory even might be true unless we can conceive of what it 
would be like for it to be true.8 I claim: what it is to be able to conceive of what it would be like for a 
theory to be true is to be able to temporarily suspend disbelief in that theory and phenomenally 
imagine that it is true—that is, for it to temporarily subjectively seem that the theory is true. Since 
arguments are used to overcome stumbling blocks to doing so, and hence to helping us better 
understand the view, they are crucial to even the minimal level of justification that we should want for 
the belief that a theory might be true.  
 
Second, arguments can convince those who have certain theoretical commitments that a 
metaphysical view is consistent with those commitments, and hence might be true. In some ways 
this is just a special case of what I just described. Many philosophers treat certain sorts of 
methodological commitments as sacred beliefs (e.g. naturalism, which I will discuss in the next 
section), and are unable to get in a space where the world can subjectively seem to them to be some 
way that is inconsistent with those methodological commitments. What is a sacred belief? Here I 
follow Katsafanas’s account of sacred values. Katsafanas argues that sacred values are values that are 
inviolable (‘present themselves as not to be compromised or attenuated’), unquestionable (‘present 
                                               
8 This is a contentious claim; this doesn’t seem to be a necessary condition on justified belief that a scientific theory 
might be true, and so those who want to assimilate metaphysics to science shouldn’t be happy with it. See (redacted) for 
discussion.  
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themselves as not to be doubted, critiqued, or weighed against other values’), and associated with 
characteristic emotions (‘love, hatred, veneration, contempt, reverence, dread, awe, etc.). (2019, 12.) 
While Katsafanas is concerned with sacred values’ role in fanaticism of a more weighty kind (e.g. 
religious, political, moral), it seems to me that many philosophers—including (apparently) non-moral 
philosophers—have methodological stances that satisfy at least the first two of these conditions. 
These ‘sacred beliefs’ might be a sort of epistemic analogue of the more normative sacred values that 
satisfy all three conditions.  
 
That philosophers have sacred beliefs is not surprising, bad, nor even necessarily unjustified. 
However, sacred beliefs get in the way of our ability to temporarily suspend disbelief and have the 
world subjectively seem some way that is inconsistent with those beliefs. So one way that 
metaphysicians can get their readers to entertain their views is to argue that they are consistent with 
methodological commitments that are commonly held to be sacred. 
 
This same strategy might justify us in either actually full-on believing, or adjusting our credences in, 
certain metaphysical views on other views of justification. If we’re coherentists, then arguments can 
serve a crucial role not just in allowing us to suspend judgment and have the world subjectively seem 
a certain way, but in actually justifying us in believing that the world is that way, or having a significant 
credence in the world being that way. The Quinean web of belief can make sense, on the 
metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative view, both of how we could be justified in believing 
metaphysical theories, and why we still need arguments. Arguments show us what other beliefs our 
metaphysical theories are bound up with, and what beliefs we would have to shift around in order to 
accommodate them.9  
 
There is much more to say here, in particular if we want to secure metaphysical realism. I don’t have 
the space to argue that we can do so here. Instead, I emphasize that the metaphysics-as-essentially-
imaginative claim is consistent with there being no need to answer the justification question; 
whether the justification question needs answering depends on whether metaphysics aims at truth. 
And whether metaphysics aims at truth is independent of whether metaphysics is essentially 
imaginative. Still, I’ve tried to show that justification is still possible if metaphysics is essentially 
imaginative.10 
 
4. What about the Naturalistic Claim?  
One common naturalistic move is to try to make (acceptable) metaphysics continuous with science: 
a posteriori metaphysics, with goals similar to those of science, and that works within the bounds of 
what science tells us about the world, is acceptable, and other, more “speculative” metaphysics is 
not. 
 
If the value of metaphysics comes even partly from its being an imaginative pursuit, what should we 
say about this claim? While it perhaps doesn’t make sense to talk about things that are up to us as 
being also a priori (since they may not, initially speaking, be candidates for being propositions that 
we know or are justified in believing), clearly metaphysics-as-imaginative is conducive to a priori 
metaphysical projects. And the naturalistic view just described is unhappy with a priori metaphysics; 
                                               
9 I part ways here with Rosen, who argues that the considerations at stake in arguments in ‘speculative’ metaphysics are 
esoteric and ‘play no role whatsoever outside of technical philosophy’ (forthcoming, 10).  
10 Looking to work on whether and how we can get knowledge or justification from imagination is a next step here, e.g. 
the papers in Kind and Kung (2016).   
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it, superficially at least, should be even more unhappy with the idea that metaphysics is not just a 
priori, but up to us. But this is too quick: perhaps naturalists who hold the kinds of views under 
discussion here should take the very fact that treating metaphysics as essentially imaginative makes 
metaphysics up to us to entail that metaphysics is outside of the bounds of the kind of inquiry that 
must be continuous with science in order to be meaningful.  
 
For presumably naturalists don’t think that artistic creation needs to be continuous with scientific 
investigation into reality. (Note: this is not an ontological claim about whether naturalists think that 
aesthetic properties supervene on or are grounded in descriptive properties; that claim is consistent 
with the idea that artistic creation is methodologically distinctive and does not (and should not) 
proceed in the same fashion as scientific investigation does.) If metaphysics is more like art than 
science—if it is essentially imaginative and (at least in part) ‘up to us’—then there is no reason that it 
should be like science.  
 
Naturalists are free, of course, to only engage with metaphysical views which are consistent with 
their naturalistic commitments. Arguments that a view is consistent with naturalism can serve to 
convince them to take a metaphysical view seriously enough to suspend disbelief and attempt to get 
the world to subjectively seem to them as the metaphysical view says it is.  
 
But if metaphysics is essentially imaginative, and among its goals are to allow us to have the world 
subjectively seem to us ways that we might not have previously imagined it might be, then I suspect 
that taking any claim that rules out engagement with vast swaths of metaphysics to be a sacred belief 
is a mistake. At least one part of what is important and valuable about metaphysics is imagination 
and understanding, and treating methodological stances as sacred makes us lose out on vast swaths 
of metaphysics. This isn’t an attack on naturalists—the same kind of thing can be said about, e.g., 
those who treat theism as sacred in engaging with metaphysics. On the metaphysics-as-essentially-
imaginative view, this is a mistake along the same lines as refusing to engage with non-religious art. 
I’m neither a naturalist nor a theist, but I fall prey to holding certain things to be sacred such that I 
can’t have someone’s metaphysical view subjectively seem, temporarily, to be true to me, and thus 
understand it.  
 
There are other things that matter besides truth. Imagination is both intrinsically and instrumentally 
(in part because it can lead to understanding) valuable. Understanding is an important goal of certain 
kinds of inquiry. On the metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative view, both imagination and 
understanding are central to what metaphysics is for. But justified belief aims at truth, not 
imaginative capacity, or understanding. If we focus too much on having justified beliefs, it is harder 
for us to suspend disbelief and try to inhabit views that we don’t believe. And there is value in doing 
so.  
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